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I. Introduction
By the Rehnquist Court's end, much of lay and learned opinion had
ascribed to it a reestablishment of state prerogatives and a revival of
federalism.' Commentators noted how the Rehnquist Court had overturned
"dozens of federal laws that sought to project federal authority into what the
Supreme Court majority viewed as the domain of the states."'2  Scholars
observed how, in the last fifteen years, the Court had struck down at least ten
federal statutes on federalism grounds.3 In contrast, in the prior fifty years, the
Supreme Court had only once found that a statute violated principles of
federalism. 4 "Over the past fifteen years, the U.S. Supreme Court has breathed
life into what appeared to be a moribund, abstract, technical area of law,"5 and
renewed attention has fallen upon the federal-state balance of power.
6
1. For popular opinions, see, e.g., Jeffrey Segal, Picks Didn't Always Do Right by GOP,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 5, 2005, at A31 ("One area where the Rehnquist court has advanced the
conservative cause is federalism...."); Linda Greenhouse, The Rehnquist Court and Its
Imperiled States' Rights Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, at A4 ("A hallmark of the
Rehnquist Court has been a re-examination of the country's most basic constitutional
arrangements, resulting in decisions that demanded a new respect for the sovereignty of the
states and placed corresponding restrictions on the powers of Congress."); Editorial, Rehnquist's
Test, L.A. TIMES, March 24, 2005, at B12 ("If there is one principle Rehnquist has spoken for
forcefully in his years on the court, it is federalism."). For opinions among the learned, see, e.g.,
Herman Schwartz, A Deeply Rooted Revolution, THE RECORDER, July 15,2005, at A5 (claiming
that Rehnquist and O'Connor led a "federalism revolution"); Michael Keenan, Is United States
v. Morrison Antidemocratic?: Political Safeguards, Deference, and the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, 48 How. L.J. 267, 268 (2004) ("It is this reassertion of structural boundaries between
the federal government and states that will be remembered as the hallmark of the Rehnquist
Court.").
2. Linda Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court, Dies at
80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A16.
3. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429, 430 (2002) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's revival of
federalism).
4. See id (providing history of Court's federalism jurisprudence).
5. Denise C. Morgan, A Tale of Two Federalisms, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 615, 615
(2006).
6. See id. (describing newfound scholarly interest in Court's federalism jurisprudence).
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Despite the Rehnquist Court's use of judicial review to advance
federalism, however, many constitutional scholars question its decisions'
cumulative coherence and likely future influence.7 The incoherence appears
particularly in what many describe as the cornerstone of the Rehnquist Court's
federalism, its defense of state sovereign immunity.8 Sovereign immunity9
protects states from the suits of individuals.' 0 It also indirectly protects States
from the federal government, which often attempts to enforce its laws by
enabling individuals to sue States through private causes of action or citizen-
7. See id. (noting that "the new federalism has come at the price of confusion and
instability"); Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People's Affection: Federalism's Forgotten
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REv. 329, 329 (2003) (asserting that the Rehnquist Court has failed
to articulate an "overarching vision of federal-state relations"); Calvin Massey, Federalism and
the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 518 (2002) ("The Rehnquist Court lack[ed] a
coherent federalism philosophy."); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the "Sounds of
Sovereignty" but Missing the Beat: Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REv.
11, 14 (1998) (noting that the Court has not "articulate[d] a coherent theory of federalism that
explains the discrete results reached in particular cases and that would facilitate reasonably
accurate predictions regarding the probable results in future cases"). But see William H. Pryor,
Jr., Madison's Double Security: In Defense of Federalism, the Separation of Powers, and the
Rehnquist Court, 53 ALA. L. REv. 1167, 1169 (2002) (describing the Rehnquist Court's
federalism jurisprudence as "principled, coherent, and true to the text and structure of the
Constitution").
8. For acknowledgment of the centrality of sovereign immunity to the Court's federalism
jurisprudence, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 41-85 (2002) (issuing, from a federal judge's perspective, a
diatribe against the Rehnquist Court's expansion of sovereign immunity); Katherine Florey,
Insufficiently Jurisdictional: The Case Against Treating State Sovereign Immunity as an Article
IIDoctrine, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1375, 1377-78 (2004) (noting that it is "a scholarly commonplace
to regard the expansion of state sovereign immunity doctrine as a centerpiece of the Rehnquist
[C]ourt's New Federalism jurisprudence"). For criticism of the Court's sovereign immunity
jurisprudence, see Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who 's Afraid ofThe Eleventh Amendment?
The Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 213, 215
(2006) (arguing that the academy overstates the influence of the Rehnquist Court's
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment on the enforcement of federal policy); Scott
Fruehwald, The Principled and Unprincipled Grounds of the New Federalism: A Call for
Detachment in the Constitutional Adjudication of Federalism, 53 MERCER L. REv. 811,836-63
(2002) (criticizing the Court's "unprincipled" state sovereign immunity jurisprudence).
9. For concision's sake, this Note uses the otherwise unmodified phrases "sovereign
immunity" or "immunity" to refer to state sovereign immunity and not to federal sovereign
immunity. For a discussion of the latter doctrine, see generally Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the
Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REv. 521 (2003).
10. See Note, The Irrational Application of Rational Basis: Kimel, Garrett, and
Congressional Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2146, 2169
(2001) (concluding that sovereign immunity bars suits for money damages against states,
"thereby closing off the single most important avenue for those individuals to enforce their
rights against states").
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suit provisions.1' Sovereign immunity does not shield States from suits brought
by other States and by the federal government.1
2
The impermanence of the Rehnquist Court's sovereign immunity
jurisprudence has been demonstrated recently by the Roberts Court's overruling
of one of the earlier Court's central provisions-that statutes passed under
Article I powers did not abrogate state immunity.' 3 This doctrinal back-and-
forth characterizes much of the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity
jurisprudence over the past few decades.' 4 This Note focuses on one of the
latest swerves, 15 Lapides v. Board of Regents.16 Lapides ruled that a State
11. For examples of the aims of federal private causes of actions, see Pamela H. Bucy,
Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2-6, 31-43 (2002) (describing private causes of actions in
general and in particular the federal government's use of citizen suits to compel States to
comply with environmental regulations); Michelle Reed, Note, "Arising Under"Jurisdiction in
the Federalism Renaissance: Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of
Maryland, 2002 BYU L. REv. 717, 733-38 (discussing the intersection of sovereign immunity
and private causes of action in the context of federal telecommunications law).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644 (1892) (providing that States can
still be sued by the federal government); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657 (1838)
(providing that States can be sued by other States).
13. See Cent. Va. Cmty. College v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1005 (2006) (permitting
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity under its Article I powers); cf Alden v. Maine,
57 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (noting that it is "settled doctrine" that Article I does not permit
abrogation of States' rights).
14. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,22-23 (1989) (upholding Congressional abrogation
of state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers)); Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1980) (overruling Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976) and partially overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,201 (1968) (holding
that Congress could regulate a state to the constitutional extent that Congress could regulate an
individual)). Notice how quickly the Court reversed itself: Only seven years separate Seminole
Tribe and Union Gas; twelve years cover the two reversals in the Wirtz line of cases.
15. See, e.g., Paul Horton, Lapides v. Board of Regents and the Untrustworthiness of
Unanimous Supreme Court Decisions, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1057, 1058 (2004) (asserting that
"[a] fter two decades of hard-fought, inch-by-inch progress, mostly in the direction of clarifying
the relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrines associated with State
Sovereign Immunity, [with Lapides] the Rehnquist Court has again opted for disarray").
16. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613,623 (2002) (ruling that state removal to
federal court amounted to a waiver of its sovereign immunity). Lapides, a professor employed
by the Georgia state university system, brought suit in state court against the State and the
Regents in their personal capacities. Id. at 616. Lapides alleged that university officials had
placed allegations of sexual harassment in his personnel files in violation of state law. Id.
Defendants removed to Federal District Court, where they sought dismissal. Id. at 617. Those
whom Lapides had sued in their personal capacities successfully argued that the doctrine of
"qualified immunity" barred Lapides's federal-law claims against them. Id. The State,
conceding that a state statute had waived sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court,
argued that it enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Id. The
District Court rejected and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the immunity
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could not advance in federal court a sovereign immunity defense waived by
state statute or through litigation on the merits. 17 The decision appeared to
many as a surprising reversal, or at least tempering, of the Rehnquist Court's
earlier federalism decisions.' 8 It has cast doubt on the current state of state
sovereign immunity. 19 It has led to a circuit split on the ruling's scope,20 the
resolution of which is this Note's topic.
Part II of this Note places Lapides in the history of sovereign immunity
and its exceptions. Part III analyzes Lapides and the arguments of both sides of
the circuit split, while criticizing the doctrine of waiver-by-removal. Part IV
appraises the arguments of the courts adopting waiver-by-removal, and instead
recommends the adoption of the Fourth Circuit's limited waiver rule. In
conclusion this Note urges the Court and other courts to adopt the Fourth
Circuit's rule.
11. State Sovereign Immunity and Waiver in Historical Context
Lapides belongs to sovereign immunity's long and confusing history.2'
Subpart A provides the development of the intertwined jurisprudences of
sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. Subpart B describes
the three exceptions to sovereign immunity, providing their current scope and
discussing their constitutional legitimacy. Both subparts demonstrate the
defense. Id. The Court construed the Eleventh Amendment to provide that States do enjoy
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court, but that the immunity may be
waived. Id. at 619. Waiver was satisfied when the State voluntarily invoked a federal court's
jurisdiction. Id. at 622. For this reason, Georgia had waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity, and Lapides's suit survived the defense. Id. at 623.
17. See id. at 623 (providing the holding).
18. See Shannon Sheppard, Lapides: Striking a Balance Between State Sovereignty and
Fairness to Individual Litigants?, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1741, 1741 (2003) (describing the
Lapides decision as "quite unexpected" in light of previous decisions).
19. See Horton, supra note 15, at 1058 (discussing Lapides's disruptive effect).
20. Compare Stewart v. North Carolina, 393 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 2004) (restricting
waiver), with Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1207 (6th Cir. 2002) (expanding
waiver).
21. Many constitutional histories discuss this Note's topics at longer length than the
narrower points to which this Part confines itself. See generally JOHNATHAN O'NEILL,
ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005); MELVIN I.
UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (2001); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (2000); JOHN V. ORTH, THE
JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(1987).
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confusion of immunity jurisprudence and waiver's centrality to it-two issues
that Lapides has failed to resolve.
A. Sovereign Immunity and Eleventh Amendment Immunity in
Historical Context
Sovereign immunity derives from the axiom that "no suit or action can be
brought against the King, even civil matters, because no court can have
jurisdiction over him... [flor all jurisdiction implies superiority of power."
22
The Court asserts that states enjoyed this immunity before and after the
23Constitution's ratification. As currently understood, state sovereign immunity
has two parts: "[F]irst, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal
system; and second, that it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. 2 4  The Court
describes state sovereignty as indispensable to the federal system. 25 Yet the
Constitution nowhere mentions state sovereignty.26 The historical record
instead indicates that, while many Constitutional Convention delegates believed
the doctrine to inform the Constitution,27 their attempts to explicate the doctrine
22. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 235 (1769).
23. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (stating that the sovereign immunity
enjoyed by the states before constitutional ratification exists undiminished except as altered by
the Constitutional Convention or by later constitutional amendments); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410, 416 (1979) (finding state sovereign immunity "based on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends") (citations omitted). The equal footing doctrine holds that new states enter the Union
with the same privileges as those currently enrolled. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (discussing the
"sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they
retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union upon an equal footing
with the other States) except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional
Amendments"). Like state sovereign immunity, however, the equal footing doctrine goes
unmentioned by the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. Art. 4, § IV ("New States may be admitted
by the Congress into this Union.").
24. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
634 (1999) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)).
25. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 748 (1999) (asserting that states are "residuary sovereigns and
joint participants in the governance of the Nation").
26. See Scott Dodson, Vectoral Federalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 393, 415 (2003)
("Nowhere does the Constitution mention state sovereignty, much less define what attributes of
sovereignty the states retained upon ratification."). The Constitution, however, does impose
several limits on the states. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. Art. I., § 10 (prohibiting states from issuing
bills of attainder or from impairing the obligation of contract).
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (claiming states need not fear
Article III diversity jurisdiction because they retain a "residuary and inviolable sovereignty").
These arguments countered the criticisms faulting the proposed constitution for not adequately
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in an amendment failed28 Ever after, the Court has never succeeded in
grounding its immunity decisions in constitutional text.29
Instead, the Court has justified its sovereign immunity rulings from
deductions drawn from the "constitutional design, 30  the "system of
federalism,' and the "plan of the convention."32 Yet as Justice Breyer has
observed:
These words ... suffer several defects. Their language is highly abstract,
making them difficult to apply. They invite differing interpretations at least
as much as do the Constitution's own broad liberty-protecting phrases, such
as "due process of the law" or the word "liberty" itself. And compared to
these latter phrases, they suffer the additional disadvantage that they do not
actually appear anywhere in the Constitution.
33
Perhaps because of the absence of a textual anchor, the Court has
variously asserted that state sovereign immunity derives from internationally-
accepted axioms of law34 or from the English common law. 35 The Court has
found sovereign immunity reserved by the Tenth Amendment, 36 contained
protecting state sovereignty. See, e.g., 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 429 (Brutus) (1981)
(claiming Article III is "improper, because it subjects a state to answer in a court of law, to the
suit of an individual. This is humiliating and degrading to a government .... "); Scott Dodson,
Dignity: The New Frontier of State Sovereignty, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 777, 786 (2003) (providing
historical context of state sovereign immunity in the Republic's first years).
28. See, e.g., 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITuTION 409 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S
DEBATES] (recounting New York's proposed amendment that nothing in the Constitution "is to
be construed to authorize any suit to be brought against any state, in any manner whatever").
29. For an excellent overview of the problems involved, see generally John F. Manning,
The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663
(2004).
30. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 731 (1999).
31. Id. at 730.
32. Id.
33. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 778 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
34. See Beers v. Arkansas, 1 U.S. 527, 529 (1857) ("It is an established principle of
jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in
any other, without its consent and permission.").
35. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Dep't of Pub. Health
and Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279,288 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Sovereign immunity
is a common-law doctrine that long predates our Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment,
although it has, of course, been carried forward in our jurisprudence.").
36. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-14 (1999) ("Any doubt regarding the
constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment,
which, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay lingering concerns
about the extent of the national power.").
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within the Eleventh Amendment, 37 or located intrinsically within the
Constitution.38 This confusion is compounded by confusion regarding the
doctrine's nature. The Court has explained sovereign immunity as an
absence of personal jurisdiction39 and as a limit on subject matter
jurisdiction,4 0 as a right,4 1 as an affirmative defense,42 and as an immunity
from any suit at all.43
Sovereign immunity jurisprudence has been confused by the language
of the Eleventh Amendment, ratified in 1798 to sustain an aspect of
sovereign immunity disregarded by a Court decision. 44 The Eleventh
Amendment reads in full: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
37. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (describing the
Court's expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment). The Court noted:
Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans v. Louisiana, we have understood
the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that the States
entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the judicial authority in
Article III is limited by this sovereignty.
Id. (citations omitted).
38. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 730 ("While the constitutional principle of sovereign immunity
does pose a bar to federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States... this is not the
only structural basis of sovereign immunity implicit in the Constitution[] . . ").
39. See Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In
certain respects, the immunity bears substantial similarity to personal jurisdiction requirements,
since it can be waived and courts need not raise the issue sua sponte.").
40. Id. at 391 (raising the issue and asserting its lack of resolution).
41. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (describing the waiver of sovereign
immunity as a surrender of a "constitutional right[]").
42. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19 (1982) (discussing when
Eleventh Amendment defenses may be brought).
43. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 766 (2002)
("Sovereign immunity does not merely constitute a defense to monetary liability or even to all
types of liability. Rather, it provides an immunity from suit."); see also P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer
Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145-46 (1993) (rejecting the argument that
sovereign immunity is merely a defense to liability and explaining that it is also an immunity
from suit); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,662-64 (1974) (describing sovereign immunity as
protecting states from both "suits" and "liability").
44. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14 (1890) (providing a history of the Eleventh
Amendment). Whether in fact States could be unwillingly subject to suit under the state-citizen
clause was a matter of disagreement among the Founders. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 28, at 533 (recording Madison's belief that the state-citizen clause only authorized States to
sue as plaintiffs); id. at 555-56 (recording's Marshall's agreement with Madison, although
suggesting immunity did not extend to state legislatures); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487
(Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that states are not subject to suit without consent, whether in the
future or at a constitutional convention). But see 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 573-75
(recording Edmund Randolph's beliefs that States should be liable for debts in federal court); id.
at 549 (recording Edmund Pendleton's argument for jurisdiction over States).
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not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. ', 45 The narrowness of this
wording and the Amendment's swift passage 46 testify to the unpopularity of
the Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.47 In essence, Chisholm held
that Article III's provision for federal diversity jurisdiction 48 trumped
States' common-law sovereign immunity.49 The Eleventh Amendment
overruled the decision.50
In succeeding years, however, the Court has confused things further by
interpreting the Eleventh Amendment more broadly than the text
warrants. 5' The starkest instance of this expansion came in Hans v.
Louisiana.52  Hans's facts reversed Chisholm's, as Hans sued his
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
46. The amendment, proposed on March 4, 1794, was ratified on February 7, 1795, when
the twelfth of fifteen states approved it. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Comm. Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 708 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (remarking upon the "vehement speed" of the
amendment's passage).
47. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419,445 (1793) (ruling that sovereign immunity did
not protect a State from suits from another State's citizens). A South Carolinian's executor sued
Georgia to recover default payment for medical supplies. Id. at 422. When brought in a
Georgia court, the State's attorney general claimed immunity from the federal courts. Id. at 426.
Georgia maintained that it was a sovereign state and thus free from suit save by its own consent.
Id. The Court found that such immunity did not exist. Id. at 445. Article III of the Constitution
provided for jurisdiction by the Court when a State was a party to a controversy between a State
and citizens of another state, as in this case. Id. at 447. The interpretation that the State must be
the plaintiff was invalid. Id. Therefore, plaintiff had standing to bring a suit in assumpsit
against the State. Id. The Court entered an order allowing such with service to be made upon
the governor and the attorney general of the State, and making the State's failure to appear or to
show cause grounds for a default judgment. Id. at 450.
48. See U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend... to
Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State .... ").
49. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 450 (finding diversity jurisdiction outweighed common-law
sovereign immunity). States feared that "federal courts would force them to pay their
Revolutionary War debts, leading to their financial ruin." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 151 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 151 (providing the rationale for the Eleventh
Amendment's creation and ratification).
51. See Manning, supra note 29, at 1666 (describing how "strong purposivism" has
influenced reading of the Amendment).
52. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (finding the Eleventh Amendment bars
suits from States' own citizens). Plaintiff Hans sued his home state of Louisiana for defaulting
on outstanding bonds. Id. at 2. The State argued the defense of sovereign immunity. Id. Hans
argued that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to suits between a State and its citizens. Id.
at 3. The issue before the Court, therefore, was whether federal jurisdiction encompassed suits
between a State and its citizens on a federal question. Id. at 6. The Court admitted that the
Constitution does not specifically provide for federal jurisdiction in suits between a citizen and
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domiciliary State.53 Because the Constitution only forbade suits against
States by non-citizens, 54 Plaintiff reasonably claimed to be "not embarrassed
by the obstacle of the Eleventh Amendment." 55 Rather than rely on extra-
constitutional principles of sovereign immunity, the Court justified its
decision by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court asked, "Can we suppose
that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be
left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts,
whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was
indignantly repelled? 5 6  The Court thought otherwise, and found the
Eleventh Amendment, despite its limited wording, to contain a general
establishment of state sovereign immunity.57  The decision blurs the
distinction between Eleventh Amendment immunity and sovereign immunity,
and for the last century the Court's inflated Eleventh Amendment has served
as a textual proxy of common-law blanket immunity.
58
The consequences of locating traditional sovereign immunity in the
Eleventh Amendment are controversial, and are discussed more fully later.
59
Courts remain confused about the distinctions between "Eleventh
Amendment immunity" and "state sovereign immunity." While the Supreme
a State, but then noted that Article III gives federal jurisdiction over "all cases" arising under a
federal question. Id. at 7-9. Further, the Court argued that an inequitable situation would
develop if a State's action could give rise to suits from citizens but bar those by non-citizens.
Id. at 9. For these reasons the Court interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to bar suits from
States' citizens against home States, and upheld Louisiana's sovereign immunity defense. Id. at
15.
53. Id. at 2.
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (barring suits "against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State").
55. Hans, 134 U.S. at 3.
56. Id. at 15.
57. Id. at 20-21. Hans is still good law. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood,
541 U.S. 440, 446 (2003) (citing Hans to support the proposition that "[f]or over a century,
however, we have recognized that the States' sovereign immunity is not limited to the literal
terms of the Eleventh Amendment").
58. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 3-5 (1988) (examining the argument that the Eleventh
Amendment is part of States' common-law sovereign immunity); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 517
(1978) (questioning the source of state sovereign immunity); Hien Ngoc Nguyen, Comment,
Under Construction: Fairness, Waiver, and Hypothetical Eleventh Amendment Jurisdiction, 93
CAL. L. REv. 587, 597-98 (2005) (discussing the lack of constitutional support for Hans's
holding).
59. See infra Part IV.B.2 (arguing for a waiver doctrine founded on sovereign immunity
and not Eleventh Amendment immunity).
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Court cautions against equating the terms,6° it is itself hardly innocent of
this loose usage. 6' While "Eleventh Amendment immunity" may be only an
expression of "state sovereign immunity," 62 in practical effect the two are
usually indistinguishable, and "the Eleventh Amendment closes the federal
courthouses to suits against member states, 63 wherever the plaintiff lives.
It is generally accepted that, whatever Hans's implications, the Eleventh
Amendment now forestalls federal jurisdiction over most private suits
against unwilling States. 64
B. Limits on State Sovereign Immunity
The Court currently recognizes three exceptions to sovereign
immunity. They are: (1) the Young state-actor fiction; (2) abrogation of
immunity by Congress; and (3) state waiver of immunity (consent to suit).
65
The diminished strength of the first two exceptions underscores the
importance of waiver, the exception central to Lapides.6 6
60. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999) (cautioning against confusion of
sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunities).
61. For examples, see generally College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. (II), 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (confusing both terms); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
521 U.S. 261 (1997) (same).
62. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 267-68 (referring to "the broader concept of
immunity, implicit in the Constitution, which [the Court has] regarded the Eleventh Amendment
as evidencing and exemplifying"). This understanding is long standing. See Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-99 (1984) (explaining relationship between
Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity); Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490,497 (192 1)
(same).
63. James E. Pfander, Member State Liability and Constitutional Change in the United
States and Europe, 51 AM. J. COMp. L. 237, 258 (2003).
64. See Nguyen, supra note 58, at 598 (summarizing Hans's general effect).
65. Id. at 598-600. Strictly speaking, the Young state actor fiction is not an exception to
state sovereign immunity as it purports to affect only the state actor. In practice, of course, the
fiction acts like other restraints on state action. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Sav. Bank II, 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) (giving the Court's view oftwo main exceptions
to state sovereign immunity, congressional abrogation and waiver).
66. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the
Eleventh Amendment, 52 DuKE L.J. 1167, 1170 (2003) ("Since its landmark decision in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Supreme Court has steadily constricted the set of
circumstances in which private parties may sue states. [As] this set diminishes, each remaining
element in the set takes on increased importance.").
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1. The State-Actor Exception
The first exception, the Ex Parte Young 67 state actor fiction, sprang
from a Minnesota official's attempted use of the Eleventh Amendment to
overturn a federal injunction entered against him. 68 The Court rejected his
plea, holding that citizens may sue state officers to enjoin violation of
federal law. 69 The Court reasoned that by acting outside federal law, state
actors (even in obeying state law) have exceeded a state's authority and are
therefore unprotected by the Eleventh Amendment. 70 The Young decision
thus creates a legal fiction that it is not the states but their actors who lie
subject to suit. 7' One scholar describes state-officer suits as "a way of
dodging the protections that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity would
otherwise confer on the states in federal court. 72  The Court's
disingenuousness has led to criticism, 73 even after the exception was
67. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 130 (1908) (finding that a state official cannot use
sovereign immunity to protect unconstitutional acts). Minnesota limited railroad rates and
heavily penalized their violation, which drew a lawsuit in federal court from railroad
shareholders, who asserted violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 124. Young, the State's Attorney General, argued that the Eleventh Amendment protected
States from suits by their citizens. Id. The federal court, unconvinced, restrained Young from
enforcing the rates. Id. Young subsequently sued in state court to enjoin the railroads to adopt
the new rates. Id. The federal court thereupon held Young in contempt, but permitted him to
file a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court. Id. The Court found the Minnesota rates
unconstitutional, then addressed the more vexing issue of whether the Eleventh Amendment
permitted a state official to be restrained from prosecuting violations of such laws. Id. at 126.
Young argued that he was merely acting for the State when he sought to enforce its laws. Id at
124. The Court held, however, that a state official's unconstitutional act cannot be done on
behalf of the State because the Constitution's Supremacy Clause voids all contrary laws. Id. at
130. Whenever a state official enforces an unconstitutional law, that individual therefore is
stripped of "his official or representative character." Id. He is merely a private citizen who can
be sued for injunctive relief without implicating the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
68. Id. at 124.
69. Id. at 130.
70. Id. This fiction, though transparent, can claim common law antecedents. See 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at 244 ("In the exertion therefore of those prerogatives, which the
law has given him, the king is irrefutable and absolute .... And yet, if the consequence of that
exertion be manifestly to the grievance or dishonour of the kingdom, the parliament will call his
advisers to a just and severe account.").
71. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 130 (finding state actors liable to suit).
72. James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There's a Remedy, There's a Right:
A Skeptic's Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REv. 215, 216 (2004).
73. See id. at 218 (finding that, its beneficial effects aside, the doctrine ofEx Parte Young
is "not constitutionally viable"); Julie Jensen Nelson, Ex Parte Young and Congressional
Abrogation. Can the Two Peacefully Coexist?, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 949,970 (2003) (discussing
the artificiality of the Ex Parte Young decision).
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limited to injunctive relief in Edelman v. Jordan.7 4 Currently States must
waive immunity in order for defendants to recover damages.75
2. Congressional Abrogation
The second exception to sovereign immunity is congressional abrogation,
which Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer76 limited to certain suits brought under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment.77 Through this section, the Court found that
"Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce.., the substantive
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody
significant limitations on state authority. 7 8 In effect, by its later ratification the
74. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660 (1974) (finding that participation in a
federal regulatory program did not automatically constitute a waiver of immunity). Jordan sued
Illinois for violating federal time limits in the administration of a federal-state aid prograr. Id.
at 652. He sought an injunction to force the State to award him retroactively the aid lost
through the State's delay. Id. The issue before the Court was whether a federal court could
require States to restore money wrongfully withheld from their citizens. Id. at 654. The Court
noted that few, if any, Eleventh Amendment cases had ever held that States could be required to
retroactively repay withheld funds. Id. at 656-57. The Court then distinguished these payments
from payments that are ordered after an injunction is issued. Id. at 658. Finally, the Court
refused to view participation in the federal aid program as constructive consent to suit. Id. at
660. The Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment required that the state could not be
made to restore the funds it should have been paying out to aid applicants. Id. at 662.
75. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 63, at 248 (advising that only through waiver will States
have to pay damages for violations of commercial regulations). Lapides notes that "suits for
money damages against the State [are] the heart of the Eleventh Amendment's concern."
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002).
76. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,451 (1976) (finding that laws passed under the
Fourteenth Amendment may abrogate sovereign immunity). The Congressional statute Title VII
allowed individuals to sue state governments to recover money damages for discrimination
based on race, sex, or national origin. Id. at 446. Male retirees sued Connecticut under this
provision. Id. at 445. Connecticut invoked its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and
the District Court and Court of Appeals both permitted only injunctive relief. Id. The issue
before the Court was whether the Fourteenth Amendment could fully override the States'
protection under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 450. The Court distinguished Edelman v.
Jordan because the instant case was begun under an express provision by Congress permitting
such a suit. Id. The Court ruled that Congress has the power under the Fourteenth Amendment
to abrogate the sovereign immunity of States, because the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted
specifically to enforce civil rights guarantees against them. Id. at 451. The Court therefore
invalidated Connecticut's sovereign immunity defense and permitted suits against a State for
damages, if such damages are explicitly authorized by Congressional statute. Id.
77. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 451 (limiting the
scope of congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity to Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
78. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 449.
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 753 (2007)
Fourteenth Amendment trmps the Eleventh.79 For similar reasons, the Court has held
that States enjoy immunity from suits arising under Congress's much broader Article I
powers.80 With this understanding, the Court rejected the doctrine of "implied
waiver," in which a state waived immunity by acting within the purlieus of a federal
regulatory scheme.8' Currently the Court requires that a citizen suing a State in federal
court find: (1) a clear violation under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) that the
implicated statute provides a private right to sue; (3) a pattern of repeated violations
affecting a large group of people; (4) that the statutory remedy fits the violation; and
(5) that insufficient remedies are available at the state court level.82 The Court has not
hesitated to strike down statutes that do not meet these requirements.8 3 Abrogation's
stiff requirements has likely contributed to the increasing interest in waiver.
3. Waiver
The third exception to immunity is the longest recognized-that "a State




79. See id. (giving rationales for this decision).
80. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (noting that it is "settled doctrine" that
Article I does not provide grounds for abrogation of States' rights); Fed Mar. Comm'n v. S.C.
State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760-61 (2002) (holding that sovereign immunity bars a federal
agency from adjudicating a private party's complaint against a nonconsenting state); Pfander,
supra note 63, at 247 (describing doubts that Congress could abrogate sovereign immunity as
regards, among other things, patents and other intellectual property). But see Central Va. Cmty.
Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1005 (2006) (claiming that Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 grants
Congress the right to abrogate State's sovereign immunity from private suits arising from the
Bankruptcy code). Although the opinion did not explicitly overturn the Hans line of sovereign
immunity cases, the Court appears to have overruled them sub silencio. See id. at 1007
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision thus cannot be reconciled with our established
sovereign immunity jurisprudence, which the majority does not purport to overturn.").
81. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank (II), 527
U.S. 666, 689-91 (1999) (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks, Dep't, 377
U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (recognizing the concept of implied waiver)).
82. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 638-42 (citing requirements for claims against state
government); Allison K. Jones, Note, New Property in a New Age of Federalism, 35 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 513, 533 (2001) (providing requirements for congressional abrogation of
sovereign immunity).
83. See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (rejecting abrogation of
state immunity from the American with Disabilities Act because the record did not reveal
systematic state discrimination); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000)
(rejecting abrogation of state immunity from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
partially because Congress failed to show systematic age-based discrimination by state
employers). But see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,740 (2003) (upholding
the abrogation in the Family and Medical Leave Act).
84. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 670. This principle is long-established. See, e.g.,
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Waivers of immunity appear either by state statute or through willing participation in a
suit.85 To demonstrate participation, the Court currently requires either (1) the State's
voluntary invocation of federal courtjurisdiction, or (2) the State's "clear declaration"
that it submits to federal courtjurisdiction.86 This two-part test is effectively unitary, as
over a century of Court precedents have established that a State's voluntary invocation
of federal jurisdiction amounts to a clear declaration of submission to it.87 The
question then turns to what constitutes "voluntary invocation. 88 As the Lapides line
of cases demonstrates, this concept can be so broadly construed that it finds voluntary
waiver in State action where no waiver was intended.
//. Lapides and Aftermath
What constitutes waiver by voluntary invocation was not fully answered in
Lapides. Subpart A describes Lapides and the issues it declined to answer fully.
Subpart B describes the circuit split that arose in answering these issues.
A. Lapides: Unanswered Questions
In Lapides, a state employee sued Georgia in state court on state and federal
claims. 89 The State removed the case to federal court to assert the sovereign immunity
Employees v. Mo. Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973) (recognizing a State's privilege
to waive sovereign immunity); Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275,276 (1959)
(same); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 24 (1933) (same); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20, 33
(1890) (same); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (same).
85. See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947) ("When the State becomes an
actor and files a claim against [the fund,] it waives any immunity which it otherwise might have
had respecting the adjudication of the claim in federal court.").
86. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 675-76 (citing Great N. Life Ins. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47,
54 (1944); Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line Ry. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906)).
87. See, e.g., Gardner, 329 U.S. at 573-74 (holding that when a state files a claim in
bankruptcy court "it waives any immunity which it otherwise might have had respecting the
adjudication of the claim"); Gunter, 200 U.S. at 284-85, 289 (holding that state participation in
tax collection litigation waived Eleventh Amendment immunity); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S.
436,447 (1883) (holding Eleventh Amendment immunity waived "by the voluntary appearance
of the State in intervening as a claimant of the fund in court"). The Court found these cases
support the rule that "where a State voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights
for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of its own
voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment." Lapides v. Bd. of
Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 619 (2002) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
88. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (requiring proof of waiver by
"express language" or "overwhelming implication").
89. See Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617 (providing case's facts).
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that was barred by Georgia statute in state court. 9° The plaintiff appealed, and
the Court ruled for him, holding that a defendant-State waived sovereign
immunity by removing to federal court a state claim to which it had waived
immunity.9' This waiver could exist by virtue of state law or by "the litigation
act the State takes that creates the waiver.
'" 92
More interesting than the Court's decision, however, are the issues that the
Court declined to reach. Because plaintiff's federal claim against Georgia was
prima facie invalid, the Court limited its opinion to state-law claims.93 It
explicitly reserved for itself the issues of: (1) whether State removal of a
federal claim to federal court constituted a waiver, and (2) whether waiver
would attach to a state-law claim over which sovereign immunity from suit has
not been previously waived or abrogated.94 As subpart B shows, lower courts
have split on how to answer these questions.95
B. Aftermath
Four appellate courts have squarely answered Lapides's open questions.
Section 1 discusses and praises the Fourth Circuit's restrictive view of waiver.
Section 2 discusses and criticizes the waiver-by-removal rule established by the
Tenth, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits. In assessing each case, this Note provides:
(1) the procedural history and holding, including the timing of removal; (2) the
appellate court's reasoning; and (3) how it distinguished state sovereign
immunity from Eleventh Amendment immunity.
1. Restricting Waiver: Fourth Circuit
Of the appellate courts reaching the unresolved issues of Lapides, only the
Fourth Circuit, in its opinion in Stewart v. North Carolina,96 refrained from
90. Id. at 617 (providing the facts of the case).
91. Id. at 623-24.
92. Id. at 620.
93. Id. at 617. Lapides sued Georgia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), seeking monetary
damages. Id.
94. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002).
95. Compare Stewart v. North Carolina, 393 F.3d 484,490-91 (4th Cir. 2004) (restricting
waiver), with Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1204-06 (10th Cir. 2002)
(expanding wavier).
96. See Stewart, 393 F.3d at 486 (ruling that a State's voluntary removal to federal court
does not waive sovereign immunity). Stewart sued the North Carolina Department of
Corrections and its employees in state court for violations of state and federal law. Id.
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expanding waiver's scope.97 Stewart's plaintiff sued North Carolina in state
court on federal and state grounds; the State removed the case.98 The record
does not reveal when precisely the state sovereign immunity defense was made,
although it occurred before the merits were reached. 99 The State appealed,
arguing that the lower court had relied erroneously on Lapides to find waiver
by removal over state claims to which immunity had not been earlier waived. 100
The Fourth Circuit agreed, observing that there was nothing "inconsistent,
anomalous, or unfair about permitting North Carolina to employ removal in the
same manner as any other defendant facing federal claims."'' 1 The issue of
removing an unwaived federal claim was not decided, but would appear to fall
within the court's reasoning for removing state claims.
In reaching its opinion, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Lapides by
observing that North Carolina, unlike Georgia, had not consented to suit in its
own courts for the claims asserted by the plaintiff. 102 Because the State did not
seek to regain its previously-waived immunity, it "merely sought to have the
sovereign immunity issue resolved by a federal court rather than a state
court." 0 3 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the State was employing the rules
of civil procedure much like any other defendant would. 04
When discussing immunity, the Fourth Circuit recited the Court's
distinction in Alden that "sovereign immunity of the States neither derives
from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.'
0 5
Remarkably, the Fourth Circuit recognized the separate existence of a
"broader concept of immunity, implicit in the Constitution."1 °6 In a footnote,
Defendants removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss. Id. The district court
dismissed the federal and some but not all state claims. Id. The district court refused to dismiss
the intentional tort and the gross negligence claims, relying on Lapides to rule that by waiver the
defendants had waived sovereign immunity. Id. The defendants appealed, and the Fourth
Circuit considered whether a state waived sovereign immunity by voluntarily removing an
action to federal court when it would have been immune from the same action in state court. Id.
The appellate court found that the district court had read the rule of Lapides too broadly, and
reversed the court below. Id.
97. Id. at491.
98. Id. at 487.
99. Id.
100. Id.




105. Id. at 487 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999)).
106. Stewart, 393 F.3d at 489 (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S.
261,267-68 (1997)).
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the appellate court limited its opinion to removal on sovereign immunity, "the
longstanding principle of state sovereign immunity implicit in constitutional
order," 107 and not to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 108 The Fourth Circuit's
holding therefore does not necessarily reach the similar case in which the
plaintiff is a non-citizen.109
2. Circuits Expanding Waiver
a. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit, in Estes v. Wyoming Department of Transportation,"
0
was the first appellate court to reach the issue reserved by the Court."'
Plaintiff brought suit under federal and state causes of action against the State
in state court; the State removed the case." 2 In its notice of removal, the State
reserved the right to pursue constitutional challenges to the district court's
jurisdiction, which it did by claiming sovereign immunity before litigation on
the merits. 13 Because a Wyoming statute had waived immunity for the state
107. Id. at 490 n.5.
108. Id.
109. Given that such a scenario would fit within the explicit language of the Eleventh
Amendment, it would likely come out the same way.
110. See Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding
that removal to federal court waives sovereign immunity). After injuring her back at work,
Estes, an employee of the Wyoming Department of Transportation (WDOT), could not complete
several requirements of her job, e.g., lifting fifty pounds. Id. at 1202. She was fired. Id. Estes
sued in state court, alleging a violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and breaches of state contract and workers' compensation laws; the State removed the case. Id.
The district court found that the ADA abrogated sovereign immunity and that the WDOT had
waived sovereign immunity from the breach-of-contract claim by removing the case to federal
court. Id. The Tenth Circuit found that Wyoming statutes waived sovereign immunity on the
state claims, no matter the forum. Id. at 1204. Noting the strictness of requirements for
abrogation of immunity, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's finding that the
ADA so abrogated. Id. at 1203. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit found that Lapides holds that
"a State waives it sovereign immunity to suit in a federal court when it removes a case from state
court." Id. at 1204. Though noting that Lapides did not "squarely address" the issue of federal
suits brought to federal court, the Tenth Circuit found that Supreme Court and circuit precedent
supported such a conclusion-even if the State only removes to federal court to challenge the
jurisdiction of the federal forum. Id. at 1204-05. The Tenth Circuit concluded that WDOT
waived its sovereign immunity relative to the ADA claim and permitted Estes's suits on all
counts. Id. at 1207.
111. Both cases were filed in the same year. The Tenth Circuit abated its decision until
Lapides was filed. See id. at 1202 (furnishing procedural history).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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claim, the Tenth Circuit applied Lapides to find immunity waived for it.'1 4 In
addition, the Tenth Circuit expanded the doctrine to find waiver in the State's
removal of any claim, whether state or federal and whether waived or not.'' 5
The Tenth Circuit's ruling, though admitting that Lapides does not
"squarely answer whether the mere act of removing federal-law claims waives a
State's sovereign immunity in federal court,"' 16 found support in national and
state precedents. 1 7 The national precedents, beyond providing the general rule
on waiver through affirmative litigation conduct, gave only negative support:
"Never has the Court enunciated a requirement of litigation on the merits as a
condition of waiver."' 8  The state precedents established that a State's
participation in a lawsuit approximated consent to suit, 119 that any defendant
State's removal to federal court constituted wavier,120 and that any invocation
of federal jurisdiction proceeding from defendant-States creates jurisdiction.'12
The Tenth Circuit admitted that in each precedential case the defendant-State,
unlike the State in Estes, had chosen to litigate on the merits after removal.1
22
The Tenth Circuit, however, claimed that "nothing in these three cited cases
limits their holdings to cases litigated on the merits following removal" 23 and
that, even if they did, "Lapides now undermines the argument because it
contains no such requirement."'
124
In two sentences, the Tenth Circuit quoted the Eleventh Amendment and
noted that, "[a]s interpreted, 'an unconsenting State is immune from suits
brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another
State. 1 25 It will be worthwhile later to compare this court's casual acceptance
114. Id. at 1204.
115. Estes, 302 F.3d at 1204.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1205-06 (discussing Supreme Court and circuit precedents).
118. Id. at 1206.
119. Id. at 1204 (citing Gallagher v. Continental Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 827, 830 (10th Cir.
1974). Gallagher discussed, but did not apply, the doctrine of waiver. Gallagher, 502 F.2d at
830.
120. Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Sutton
v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf& Blind, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999)). Interestingly, in
Sutton, the circuit justifies its expansion by concluding that no Supreme Court decision
prohibited such an expansion. Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1234.
121. Estes, 302 F.3d at 1204 (citing McLaughlin v. Bd. of Trustees, 215 F.3d 1168, 1170
(10th Cir. 2000)).
122. Id. at 1205.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1202 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,662-63 (1974)).
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 753 (2007)
of the conflated sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunities to the Fourth
Circuit's more careful distinction of them.' 
26
b. Ninth Circuit
In Embury v. King,127 the Ninth Circuit became the second appellate court to
address the issues left open byLapides.128 Plaintiff sued in state court on state and
federal claims. 129 The State removed the case to federal court. 3° Defendants
successfully moved for summaryjudgment; an amended complaint was filed, and the
State then sought Eleventh Amendment immunity against both the federal and state
claims. 3 ' Though mentioning that "the Court in Lapides was careful to note that it
spoke only to the state law claims in that case," the appellate court found that "the rule
in Lapides applies to federal claims as well as to state law claims and to claims asserted
after removal as well as to those asserted before removal.' 3 2 Like the earlier decision
in Estes, the Court found immaterial whether the State had waived immunity to the
case through statute or affirmative acts of litigation. 133 Declining to permit the
"chutzpah" 134 of allowing a State to waive immunity to federal court and then to
126. Compare Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2002)
(blurring the distinction between sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunities), with
Stewart v. North Carolina, 393 F.3d 484, 490 n.5 (4th Cir. 2004) (maintaining a distinction
between sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunities).
127. See Embury v. King, 361 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding wavier in a State's
removal to federal court). Embury, a physician, sued the University of California system and
others in both state and federal courts for violations of state labor law and for violating due
process under federal and state laws. Id. at 562-64. Embury did not serve complaints on
defendants, but later filed an amended complaint in state court, demanding declaratory and
injunctive relief for the State's violation of his federal and state due process rights, in addition to
damages for his state law claims of violation of public policy and breach of contract. Id at 563.
All defendants later joined in removing the state superior court case to federal court. Id. The
defendants moved for summary judgment but did not assert sovereign immunity. Id. The
motion was granted, with leave to amend. Id. Embury filed an amended complaint, asserting
federal and state law claims for damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. Id. The
defendants again moved to dismiss, this time arguing Eleventh Amendment immunity,
eventually on all counts. Id. The trial judge refused; the State appealed, conceding no
immunity for the state charges but arguing that immunity blocked the federal charges. Id. at
564. The Ninth Circuit held that any removal waived sovereign immunity. Id. at 566.
128. See id. (finding that a State's removal to federal court waived its immunity).
129. Id. at 562-63.
130. Id. at 563.
131. Id. at 564.
132. Embury, 361 F.3d at 564.
133. See id. at 565 (finding the nature of waiver immaterial).
134. Id. at 566.
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"unwaive" it by asserting sovereign immunity, the Court pronounced a firm
rule: "Removal waives Eleventh Amendment immunity."'
35
In reaching this decision, the Ninth Circuit lingered on the lower court's
record, which, though mostly immaterial, reflected poorly on the State. 36 The
Ninth Circuit then reasoned that nothing in Lapides limited waiver to state
claims or to claims asserted in the original complaint. 37 The circuit court also
questioned the consistency of a State acquiescing in the resolution of state law
by a federal court but objecting to federal jurisdiction over the federal claims
(even though the federal claims permit supplemental jurisdiction over the state
claims). 38 The Ninth Circuit supported this position with a close reading of the
Eleventh Amendment, which extends immunity "to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States."' 139 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that "suit" is a synonym for "case," and that therefore the
case's immunity was waived, not individual complaints.140 Once the State
removed the case, in the federal court system it became "subject to liberal
amendment of the complaint."' 4' The court also relied on the persuasive
authority of Estes. 1
42
The decision nowhere mentioned the phrase "sovereign immunity." It
therefore implicitly considers the concept and the Eleventh Amendment as
coterminous. 143 The conflation of the two doctrines again contrasts with the
Fourth Circuit's distinction of them.'4
135. Id.
136. See id. at 563 (recounting how the trial judge needed to ask the State whether it
claimed sovereign immunity on state or federal claims pleadings, and how the State could not
immediately answer a question regarding to which claims sovereign immunity was being offered
as a defense). The trial court also noted that the defendant-State had only advanced the
immunity defense after the trial court had noted that it was not favorably disposed to their state
law claims. Id. at 563-64.
137. Embury, 361 F.3d at 563-64.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 565 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI) (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Embury, 361 F.3d at 565 ("In Estes v. Wyoming Department of Transportation, the
Tenth Circuit held that when a state removes a case that includes both state law and federal law
claims to federal court, it waives Eleventh Amendment immunity for both classes of claims, not
just the state law claims."). The facts differed from those in Estes, as in the instant case
California did not immediately raise the sovereign immunity defense. Id. at 563.
143. Id. at 562.
144. Compare id (equating these doctrines), with Stewart v. North Carolina, 393 F.3d 484,
490 n.5 (4th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing these doctrines).
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c. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit in Myers v. Texas145 is both the latest appellate court to
adopt waiver-by-removal and the first to do so after the Fourth Circuit split.'
46
Plaintiff sued Texas in state court on state and federal claims. 147 The State
removed to federal court, and, before the case was argued on the merits,
claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity. 48 The Fifth Circuit found "that
Lapides[ ] ... applies generally to any private suit which a state removes to
federal court.' 49 This holding included cases in which the state had not
removed a claim to which it had previously waived immunity.
The appellate court cited several supports for its reasoning. First, it found
no basis for limiting Lapides to the relatively small subset of federal cases in
which the State removes after having waived immunity in state court.150 The
Fifth Circuit also supported waiver-by-removal by grounding it in a discussion
of the "voluntary invocation principle,"'' which it placed not in the context of
litigation (i.e., contesting on the merits) but in the procedural act of removal.
52
The voluntary invocation principle had not been applied to state-law claims
before Lapides, but, the Fifth Circuit observed, "the Supreme Court gave no
indication that the principle applied only to state-law claims or that it mattered
whether the state had waived its immunity from suit in its own courts."' 53 The
Fifth Circuit also relied on generally applicable principles of consistency and
fairness.'
54
145. See Myers v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 256 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding State's wavier of
immunity in its removal to federal court). Plaintiffs brought a civil rights class action in Texas
state court under the ADA against the state of Texas, the Texas Department of Transportation,
and an individual. Id. at 239. Texas removed the case to federal district court, which remanded
the case to the state court. Id. Texas filed a motion in the state court to dismiss on grounds of
state sovereign immunity. Id. That motion was denied and Texas appealed to the state court of
appeals. Id. While the appeal was pending, Texas again removed the case to the federal district
court and again moved to dismiss on grounds of state sovereign immunity from suit. Id. The
district court agreed and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for damages and injunctive relief for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Id. The Fifth Circuit
overruled, holding that Texas waived its state sovereign immunity from suit by individuals when
it removed this case from state court to federal district court. Id. at 256.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 239.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 242.
150. See Myers, 410 F.3d at 256 (finding no language in Lapides limiting its holding).
151. Id. at243.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 246.
154. Id. at 244.
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The Fifth Circuit recited Alden's distinction between state sovereign
immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity, but noted that the term
"Eleventh Amendment immunity" has been used loosely and interchangeably
with "state sovereign immunity."'155 Any distinction between them was not
drawn until the end of the opinion, in which the court discussed Texas's
proposal that although it had waived its Eleventh Amendment forum immunity,
it retained its basic or inherent immunity from suit. 56 This poorly-supported
argument did not convince the court. 57 Instead, the court termed "Eleventh
Amendment immunity" a misnomer, recalling Alden's ruling that no separate
immunity was created by the Eleventh Amendment.
58
IV. Analysis
Because the Court has not answered the questions left by Lapides,'59 the
divided appellate courts remain the highest authorities on their resolution.
Three appellate courts adopted waiver-by-removal; the Fourth Circuit did
not. 160  Three appellate courts did not meaningfully distinguish between
Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity; the Fourth Circuit did.' 6' This
155. Myers v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 2005).
156. Id. at256.
157. Texas cited Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), and Pennhurst State School v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), without explaining their application to the instant case. Myers,
410 F.3d. at 251. The Fifth Circuit criticized the States' reasoning, stating that "Texas merely
states its conclusions about the structure of sovereign immunity and points to the pages in the
two opinions that it claims as authority and gives no further explanation." Id.
158. Myers, 410 F.3d at 251. The circuit court was persuaded, however, by the theory that
a State must separately waive suit and waive liability to damages. Id. at 252. It found a State
could constitutionally waive a right to suit without necessarily waiving its defense from liability.
Id. Its support for this proposition was New Hampshire v. Ramsey, 366 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.
2004), which stated in dicta that "a state may waive its immunity from substantive liability
without waiving its immunity from suit in a federal forum." See also Alaska v. United States,
64 F.3d 1352, 1355-56 (9th Cir. 1995) (asserting that while state sovereign immunity entitles
the state to avoid suit in a federal court, federal sovereign immunity is only a defense to
liability); Pullman Constr. Indust. v. United States, 23 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).
159. The Court has only once cited Lapides. See Montgomery v. Maryland, 535 U.S.
1075, 1075 (2002) (remanding the case).
160. Compare Myers v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 256 (5th Cir. 2005) (adopting waiver-by-
removal), Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1204-07 (10th Cir. 2002) (same),
Embury v. King, 361 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 2004) (same), with Stewart v. North Carolina, 393
F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 2004) (rejecting waiver-by-removal).
161. Compare Myers, 410 F.3d at 241, 250 (acknowledging but not applying Alden's
distinction between sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunity), Embury, 361 F.3d at 562-
66 (discussing "Eleventh Amendment immunity" without mention of sovereign immunity), and
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 753 (2007)
Part asserts that in both cases the Fourth Circuit provided the better answer.
Subpart A rejects the rationales of courts adopting waiver-by-removal. Subpart
B advocates the Fourth Circuit's decision to treat immunity as a defense and to
ground it in common-law sovereign immunity.
A. Arguments for Waiver-by-Removal
As Part III demonstrates, Lapides forbids a State to regain in federal court
the immunity it had lost by statute or through "litigation conduct"'162 in state
court. The Tenth, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits understand waiver-by-litigation
very broadly, including the act of removal. 63 The Ninth Circuit applied
waiver-by-removal to claims introduced after the removal; 164 the Tenth Circuit
applied waiver-by-removal even when the motion to remove reserved the right
to bring a constitutional defense in moving for summary judgment. 165 In
justifying such expansions of waiver, the appellate courts noted that no
language in Lapides bars them.166 The courts also cited firmer reasons than the
merely negative: fairness, comprehensiveness, and judicial economy.
Estes, 302 F.3d at 1202 (conflating the doctrines), with Stewart, 393 F.3d at 490
n.5 (distinguishing sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunity).
162. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002).
163. See Myers, 410 F.3d at 250 (observing that "we are not persuaded by Texas's
argument that Lapides must be read as limiting the ambit of the voluntary invocation principle
to cases involving state-law claims with respect to which the state has waived immunity in its
own courts"); Embury, 361 F.3d at 564 ("We conclude that the rule in Lapides applies to
federal claims as well as to state law claims and to claims asserted after removal as well as to
those asserted before removal."); Estes, 302 F.3d at 1207 (noting that "when a State removes
federal-law claims from state court to federal court ... [it] unequivocally invokes the
jurisdiction of the federal courts").
164. See Embury, 361 F.3d at 564 (finding waiver-by-removal applies to claims asserted
after removal).
165. See Estes, 302 F.3d at 1202, 1206 (finding waiver-by-removal applies even before the
motion for summary judgment is filed).
166. See Myers v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 2005) ("There is no evident basis in
law or judicial administration for severely limiting those general principles [of waiver by
removal], or Lapides's substantial overruling of Ford Motor Co., to a small sub-set of federal
cases. . . .") (citations omitted); Embury v. King, 361 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Nothing
in the reasoning of Lapides supports limiting the waiver to the claims asserted in the original
complaint .... ."); Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting
that while the State argued that waiver-by-removal only applied after litigation on the merits,
"Lapides now undermines the argument because it contains no such requirement").
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1. Fairness, Gamesmanship, and Timing
The Court justified Lapides's holding as a way to prevent States from
using sovereign immunity to "generate seriously unfair results."'167 In
expanding waiver beyond Lapides's scope, the appellate courts echo this
distaste of the "improper manipulation of the judicial process." 1 68 A material
difference, however, distinguishes the circuit courts' conceptions of unfairness
from the Supreme Court's. The Court is concerned about when the State
advances a sovereign-immunity defense after removal; 69 the appellate courts
are concerned about whether the State advances a sovereign immunity defense
after removal. 1
70
Lapides only forbids the use of an immunity defense previously waived,
whether (1) by statute 171 or (2) through acts of litigation. 172 Waiver-by-statute
appears in Lapides, when the Court forbade Georgia from maintaining in
federal court the sovereign immunity a state statute waived. 73  Lapides
addresses waiver-by-litigation by substantially overruling174 its much-criticized
decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury ofIndiana.175 In Ford Motor,
the Court spectacularly asserted sovereign immunity sua sponte after the State
167. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 619.
168. Embury, 361 F.3d at 564. Interestingly, courts often maintain that a State's motive for
removal is irrelevant. See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 621 (2002) ("Motives
are difficult to evaluate, while jurisdictional rules should be clear.").
169. See Lapides, 535 U.S. at 619 (asserting the unfairness of a State proceeding on the
merits then arguing that sovereign immunity barred the suit).
170. See, e.g., Embury, 361 F.3d at 566 (giving the absolute rule that "[r]emoval waives
Eleventh Amendment immunity").
171. See Lapides, 535 U.S. at 623-24 (forbidding an immunity defense after its waiver by
statute).
172. See id. at 620 (mentioning waiver by "litigation conduct").
173. Id. at 624.
174. See id. at 622-23 (repudiating the Ford Motor holding).
175. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treas. of nd., 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945) (finding that
a State's affirmative litigation conduct did not create wavier). A non-resident automobile
company brought suit against a State for a refund of income taxes. Id. at 460. The district court
denied recovery; the circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court did not reach the issue, finding
sua sponte that "[w]hile the state's immunity from suit may be waived, there is nothing to
indicate authorization of such waiver by Indiana in the present proceeding." Id. at 465 (citations
omitted). The Court found that the State had only waived suit in state courts. Id at 466.
Further, the Court found that the attorney general for the State of Indiana was not authorized by
statute to waive immunity from suit, and so could not waive suit by affirmative litigation
conduct-even when he argued the case on the merits in federal district and appellate courts.
Id. at 466-67. The Court could also raise the issue sua sponte, as it did in this case. Id. at 467.
The case was remanded with orders to dismiss. Id. at 470.
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had argued the merits in two lower courts. 176 Lapides disavowed Ford's
willingness to ignore waiver-by-litigation, finding that it leads to "inconsistency
and unfairness."' 17 The Court explains its position that:
It would seem anomalous or inconsistent for a State both (1) to invoke
federal jurisdiction, thereby contending that the "Judicial power of the
United States" extends to the case at hand, and (2) to claim Eleventh
Amendment immunity, thereby denying that the "Judicial power of the
United States" extends to the case at hand.
178
Appellate courts cite this passage to support a position broader than the Court
articulated. 179 The Court earlier makes clear that its reasoning is not directed to
a "situation where the State's underlying sovereign immunity from suit has not
been waived or abrogated in state court."' 180 Removing constitutes a sufficient
voluntary invocation when the immunity has previously been waived;181 this
differs from removing to have a federal tribunal adjudicate the merits of an
immunity defense. Lapides, then, stands for the rule that no immunity exists in
federal court that has been waived in state court.
1 82
After Lapides, waiver-by-statute only appeared in the state-law claims of
the underlying Tenth Circuit case. 183 There the State (before Lapides was
decided) had advanced in federal court a sovereign immunity defense that state
statute barred. 184 This circumvention clearly ran against Lapides's holding. 85
In every other case, the defendant-State had not waived its sovereign immunity
through statute.
Determining waiver-by-litigation is more contentious than establishing
waiver-by-statute. The three courts expanding wavier did not find in Lapides's
176. Id. at 467, 470.
177. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 623 (2002). More technically, the Court
ruled that waiver-by-litigation required earlier waiver-by-statute. Because the State's legislature
had not authorized the attorney general to waive immunity by litigation, the Court found that
litigation had not been waived. Ford, 323 U.S. at 467.
178. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 619.
179. See, e.g., Myers v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236,249 n. 17 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing this passage);
Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir. 2002) (same).
180. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 618.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 618, 622-23.
183. Estes, 302 F.3d at 1200.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 1204 ("Because WDOT is a division of the State of Wyoming, and
Wyoming Statutes Annotated § 1-39-104 waives Wyoming's sovereign immunity for contract-
claim suits in its own courts, Lapides is dispositive.").
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language a requirement of litigation by the merits. 186 The Tenth and Fifth
Circuits found waiver-by-removal for an assertion of immunity immediately after
removal and before the merits.'87 The Ninth Circuit found waiver-by-litigation
even after the State's assertion to an amended complaint filed for the first time in
federal court.1 88 In effect, the waiver-by-litigation rule becomes waiver-by-
removal.
The waiver-by-removal rule prejudices the states, because it denies them a
federal forum to decide the validity of their sovereign immunity.189 Under a
waiver-by-removal rule, a State would waive its immunity by removing so that a
federal court could determine it. States lose legal protections should they choose
to remove. 90 As a practical consequence, States may have to curtail litigation
activity, such as intervening in bankruptcies for public health reasons.1 9' Waiver-
by-litigation also affects other defendants in suits against States. In Lapides, for
instance, one reason the State removed was to provide its co-defendants, state
officials sued in their personal capacities, "with the generous interlocutory appeal
provisions available in federal, but not in state, court."'' 92 Because all defendants
must agree to remove, 193 those named with States will likely be forced to remain
in State court. This restriction might itself encourage plantiffs' gamesmanship.
2. Comprehensiveness and Judicial Economy
While the circuit courts gave the elimination of gamesmanship as a motive
for expanding waiver, they were also swayed by the attractions of
186. See, e.g., Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir. 2002)
(noting that Lapides does not require reaching the merits before applying waiver-by-litigation).
187. See Myers v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 2005) (providing procedural history);
Estes, 302 F.3d at 1200 (same).
188. See Embury v. King, 361 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing procedural
history).
189. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.5 (4th ed. 2003) ("The existence
of removal jurisdiction reflects the belief that both the plaintiff and the defendant should have
the opportunity to benefit from the availability of a federal forum.").
190. For one state's assistant attorney general criticism of the dangers of involuntarily
waiving sovereign immunity, see Jack Druff, State Court Sovereign Immunity: Just When Is the
Emperor Armor-Clad?, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 255 (2002).
191. See James W. Herr & Tracy M. Sullivan, Be Careful What You Ask for: You Might
Get It: Removal, Waiver, and Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 21-7 ABIJ 22, 22, 37 (2002)
(arguing that after Lapides, a State would waive immunity by intervening in a bankruptcy case
with environmental issues, or perhaps any bankruptcy case at all).
192. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 621 (2002).
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000) (listing the requirements for removal).
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comprehensiveness and judicial economy. When read narrowly, as a circuit
court has noted, Lapides affects only a "small subset"'194 of cases. The larger
share of the federal docket is filled by federal question jurisprudence, 195 which
the Court did not reach. 196 And it is unlikely that States have waived immunity
for most of the state-law claims that make it to federal court through diversity
or supplemental jurisdiction. 197 To resolve these cases, the appellate courts
unsurprisingly attempt to bring them under a single rule. The expansive view
of waiver can be seen as an attempt to create "a straightforward, easy-to-
administer rule in accord with Lapides: Removal waives Eleventh Amendment
immunity.'"s The desire for such a "straightforward, easy to administer" rule
even affects descriptions of the Lapides holding, which one commentator
explained as the rule "that a state's decision to remove a case to federal court
extinguishes its ability to subsequently invoke Eleventh Amendment
protections."199
One argument for a comprehensive rule is that its absence injures judicial
economy.200 The worst example of judicial inefficiency appears in the case
underlying the Ninth Circuit's opinion. There the federal district court
complained of having "digested considerable briefing on both the State and
federal claims in the complaint, twice heard oral argument and adjudicated two
motions to dismiss,, 20' and that the process would be duplicated in state court if
the state claims were remanded.20 2 These delays were not due to a delayed
sovereign immunity defense, however, but to the court permitting a second
complaint to be filed.20 3 Sovereign immunity was only offered in response to
it.204 A more complex case arose in the Fifth Circuit, where the State removed
194. Myers v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 2005).
195. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 189, at § 5.2.1 (describing "the core of modem federal
court jurisdiction[,] cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States[, as]
comprising the largest component of the federal courts' docket and [as being] widely viewed as
the most important component of the federal courts' workload").
196. See Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617 (limiting answer to state-law claims for which the state
has waived immunity).
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (providing for diversity jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(2000) (providing for supplemental jurisdiction).
198. Embury v. King, 361 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 2003).
199. Florey, supra note 8, at 1378.
200. A discussion of the proper balance between federalism and judicial economy exceeds
this Note's scope.
201. Embury, 361 F.3d at 563.
202. See id. (describing the case's facts).
203. Id.
204. Id.
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to federal court during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal of the denial of
its state sovereign immunity defense.20 5 The Fifth Circuit admitted, however,
that the State's reason for removal was not to relitigate sovereign immunity, but
to take advantage of a recent federal court decision favorable to its case.206 So
long as only one court decides the issue of sovereign immunity, judicial
economy does not appear impaired. The First Circuit endorsed this view when
it ruled that Rhode Island had not waived sovereign immunity by removing to a
federal court solely to have the question of its sovereign immunity
adjudicated.20 7
The judicial goals of comprehensiveness and judicial economy are
worthwhile. These goals are worthy, however, only insofar as they do not
prejudice the interests of a party to the case. In balance, the interests of the
courts, as described in this subsection, do not outweigh the disadvantages to the
defendant-States (and to joined defendants) described in the previous section.
B. The Better Choices of the Fourth Circuit
The previous subsection criticized the motivations of the three appellate
courts adopting waiver-by-removal. This section recommends that other courts
adopt a fairer, more constitutionally legitimate method by following the Fourth
Circuit in (1) limiting waiver to a defense, but not adopting waiver-by-removal,
while (2) relying on theories of state sovereign immunity rather than on the
Eleventh Amendment.
1. State Sovereign Immunity as a Waivable Defense
As the previous cases have shown, few rules recommend applying state
sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity does not appear in the federal rules
of civil procedure, 20 8 and its judicial application has been fraught with
inconsistencies. 20 9  The Court has referred to sovereign immunity as a
205. See Meyers v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 239-40 (5th Cir. 2005) (providing procedural
history).
206. Id. at 240.
207. See R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31,49-50 (1st Cir. 2002)
(permitting the State to remove for adjudication of its sovereign immunity defense).
208. See generally FED. R. CIv. P. art. I-art. XIII.
209. See, e.g., Florey, supra note 8, at 1377-78 (remarking that courts "have frequently
noted the ways in which [sovereign immunity doctrine] is both like and unlike such fundamental
Article III requirements as justiciability").
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"jurisdictional bar"2 ' that limits Article III powers. At the same time, however,
the Court permits Congress to abrogate immunity through the Fourteenth
Amendment-but does not permit any other Article III doctrine to be so
1 212limited.2  A court may possibly still be able to raise immunity sua sponte,
while Article III issues like standing must be addressed as soon as they come to
the Court's attention.21 3
Most appellate courts simplified the problem by adopting waiver-by-
removal.21 4 In its own way, this rule seems as absolute as Ford's rule that only
a state statute would permit waiver-by-litigation. 215 The Fourth Circuit, in
contrast, avoided both extremes. It permitted a State "to have the sovereign
immunity issue resolved by a federal court rather than a state court,, 21 6 so long
as the immunity had not previously been waived.217 The Fourth Circuit did not
rule on when the defense should be raised. Some authority suggests that
immunity could be raised for the first time on appeal.218 This appears in219
tension, however, with Lapides's acknowledgment of waiver-by-litigation. A
worthwhile suggestion, cited by Lapides,220 appears in a concurrence by Justice
Kennedy, who suggests treating sovereign immunity as a personal jurisdiction
22defense waivable by litigation acts.21 Should the Court after Lapides move in
this direction, the Fourth Circuit's opinion could accommodate it while
preserving its affirmation of a State's right to all of its defenses at a federal
forum.
210. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974).
211. See Florey, supra note 8, at 1380 (discussing problems with applying sovereign
immunity).
212. Id.
213. See Calderon v. Ahsmus, 523 U.S. 740,745 (1998) (contrasting Eleventh Amendment
procedural demands with Article III).
214. See supra Part IV.A.2 and accompanying text (discussing courts' desire for judicial
economy).
215. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treas. of Ind., 323 U.S. 459,466-67 (1945) (finding
an attorney general unqualified to waive sovereign immunity without legislative authorization).
216. Stewart v. North Carolina, 393 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 2004).
217. Id.
218. See Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998) (listing cases).
219. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002) (acknowledging wavier by
"litigation conduct").
220. See id. (citing Schacht).
221. See Schacht, 524 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting a treatment of
sovereign immunity akin to an individual's personal jurisdiction defense).
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History justifies this downgrade of sovereign immunity from true
immunity to ajumped-up version of a personal jurisdiction defense.222 Recent
decades have made a mockery of any state's claim to be, in the Court's words,
one of the "residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the
Nation. '2 2 3 Certainly some scholars believe in the federal system's health,224
and it is not this Note's purpose to disabuse them. Broadly-based research
attests to the fact, however, that states have witnessed the attrition of their
powers during the postbellum shift in federal-state power.2 25  That state
legislators do not directly select presidential electors but instead require them to
reflect the popular vote226 and U.S. senators' direct election 227 both symptomize
the States' political decline. This shift has proven to have been beyond the
Founders' ken.228 Many of the foreseen state checks on the federal government
now appear absurd,2 29 and only with difficulty can we envision a time when it
appeared "always [to] be far more easy for the state government to encroach
upon the national authorities, than for the national government to encroach
upon the state authorities., 230 States have been complicit in the loss of their
powers, 231 and commentators have noticed the current lack of scholarly interest
in state sovereign immunity. 232 As one notes, "[t]hroughout this [past] century,
222. For more information on this topic, see ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001).
223. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
224. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 63, at 237 ("For all of its rhetorical commitment to the
rule of law and the sovereignty of the people, the Supreme Court of the United States has
recently forged quite a robust, constitutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity.") (citations
omitted).
225. See Dodson, Vectoral Federalism, supra note 26, at 413 (summarizing the
aggrandizement of federal power after the Civil War).
226. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) ("The individual citizen has no federal
constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the
state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint
members of the Electoral College.").
227. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (establishing senators' direct election).
228. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison) ("[I]t is to be remembered, that the
[federal] government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering
laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects."); THE FEDERALISTNO. 51 (James
Madison) ("Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.").
229. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (suggesting that states' combined
militias could resist an oppressive federal government).
230. THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
231. See Pfander, supra note 63, at 258 (describing State complicity).
232. See Karen Cordry, Of State Sovereign Immunity and Prospective Remedies: The
Bankruptcy Discharge as Statutory Ex Parte Young Relief: A Response, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J.
64 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 753 (2007)
the trend at the state level in America has been to abandon the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in favor of the judicial determination of claims against the
state."233 Given this history, the Fourth Circuit's reduced immunity seems to fit
the times without destroying an aspect of sovereign immunity completely.
2. Sovereign Immunity, Not Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Fourth Circuit was also correct in grounding its opinion solely in
sovereign immunity-and it was the only appellate court to do so. Few deny
that centuries of Court precedent recognize the extra-constitutional principle of
sovereign immunity, 2 34 which is now usually conflated with the Eleventh
Amendment.235 The latter practice is not as time-honored, however, as the
earlier principle. 236  The Court may eventually reject the Amendment's
constructed meaning and read the language plainly. This shift would carry
great implications, throwing in doubt cases in which a citizen sued his own
state. A citizen-plaintiff sued his own State in Lapides and in each of the four
23cases heard by the appellate courts. 2 37 In four of the five cases, the plaintiff was
an employee or past-employee of the state.238 A more literal reading of the
Amendment would clearly have a great impact on a state's employment
practices and from there its policies generally. Should this happen, the Fourth
Circuit's opinion would escape serious consequences. The appellate court
intelligently kept to the explicit purpose and the scope of the Amendment:
The purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was to overrule Chisholm v.
Georgia, not to define the contours of state sovereign immunity generally.
23, 23 (2003) (noting the lack of articles willing to support sovereign immunity as a means of
"preserving states as the strong counterbalance to the federal government that the Founders
intended").
233. Id.
234. See supra Part II.A.4 (providing a history of sovereign immunity and the Eleventh
Amendment).
235. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing this conflation).
236. See supra Part II.A.4 (contrasting sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunities).
237. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 616 (2002) (describing an employee
suing the state university system); Myers v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 239 (5th Cir. 2005)
(describing a citizen suing the state transportation department); Stewart v. North Carolina, 393
F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 2004) (describing an employee suing the state correctional system);
Embury v. King, 361 F.3d 562-63 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing an employee suing the state
university system); Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2002)
(describing an employee suing the state transportation department).
238. See supra note 237 (providing facts about the plaintiffs).
THE BETTER COURSE IN THE POST-LAPIDES CIRCUIT SPLIT 785
Thus, Eleventh Amendment immunity is but an example of state sovereign
immunity as it applies to suits filed in federal court against unconsenting
states by citizens of other states.
239
By choosing sovereign immunity instead of a constructed inflation of the
Eleventh Amendment, the Fourth Circuit founded its opinion on stronger
ground.
V Conclusion
Lapides was rightfully decided, but the Court erred by omission. By not
explicitly rejecting the waiver-by-removal doctrine, it allowed lower courts to
apply it. Because several circuits did, and one did not, authority is divided.
The Court should resolve the issue by following the Fourth Circuit in
conceptualizing waiver as a defense but not immunity, in rejecting waiver-by-
litigation, and in grounding its decision in terms of sovereign immunity, not
Eleventh Amendment immunity. This course would mediate the extremes of
reinstating and of stripping away states' historical protections against suit. It
would also ensure that the decision rests on the most legitimate constitutional
ground. Because waiver is central to state sovereign immunity, and state
sovereign immunity is central to federalism, any Court interested in lasting
contributions to federalism should answer Lapides's open issues.
239. Stewart v. North Carolina, 393 F.3d 484, 488 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
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